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THE DUTY TO ARBITRATE-CONTRASTING
VIEWS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE
NLRB
NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co. *
INTRODUCTION
The recent case of NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co.1 illustrates a
difference in standards between the Seventh Circuit and the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in determining when labor
and management must arbitrate sympathy strike disputes. Such
disputes arise when one union honors the picket lines of another
union set up at the same location. Under a collective bargaining
agreement containing a no-strike clause and specified arbitration
procedures, the issue is whether there is a duty to arbitrate if the
sympathy strike is a violation of the no-strike provision. Further
complicating this question is whether failure to arbitrate will
operate as a defense to unfair labor practice charges brought by the
union when management disciplines employees in a sympathy
strike. In Keller-Crescent, the Seventh Circuit and the NLRB
disagreed as to when there was a duty to arbitrate such disputes.
Finding a duty to arbitrate would render the concerted activity
of the employees unprotected because failure to arbitrate would be
an affirmative defense to the unfair labor practice charge. There-
fore any discipline against them by management would stand.
Federal courts are more apt to find a duty to arbitrate than is the
NLRB. In part this is due to the types of cases with which these
jurisdictions have dealt-the federal courts must resolve contract
disputes, while the NLRB must protect the rights of employees.
When confronted with the question of whether a dispute is arbi-
trable the federal courts have been willing to presume arbitrability,
while the Board demands affirmative proof of arbitrability. Keller-
Crescent represents a situation in which the difference between the
two jurisdictions over arbitrability yields opposing decisions in the
same factual situation. This variance creates confusion as to when
the rights of sympathy strikers will be protected and when they will
not, as well as uncertainty in the interpretation of no-strike
agreements.
* 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976).
1. 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Keller-Crescent].
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FACTS
The Keller-Cresent Company is a manufacturing firm in Evans-
ville, Indiana. Different units of its employees are represented by
the Evansville Typographical Union No. 35 (Local 35), by Local 117
of the Evansville Printing and Pressmen and Assistants Union
(Pressmen), and by two other unions. During the summer of 1972,
when negotiations between the Company and the Pressmen broke
down, the Pressmen called a strike. Members of Local 35, refusing
to cross the picket lines of the Pressmen, failed to report to work.
The collective bargaining agreement between Local 35 and the
Company contained a sympathy strike provision (Section 12) and
arbitration procedures, including a no-strike clause (Section 13).2
During negotiations with the Pressmen and during the strike, the
Company informed the twelve members of Local 35 that it regarded
their refusal to cross the picket lines as a breach of Sections 12 and 13.
After the strike, the members of Local 35 who honored the Press-
men's picket lines received a one-week disciplinary suspension.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges. An adminis-
trative law judge (ALM) hearing the charges concluded that the
Local 35 employees had breached the no-strike and arbitration pro-
vision of Section 13; therefore the discipline was upheld. According
to the AL, Section 12, coupled with collateral evidence of contrac-
tual intent, reflected a desire on the part of the Company and Local
35 to ban all sympathy strikes except those sanctioned by the
International Typographical Union.
2. Keller-Crescent Company and Local 35, Evansville Typographical Union
had signed a collective bargaining agreement with the following provisions:
Section 12-No employee covered by this contract shall be required to cross
a picket line established because of a strike by, or lockout of, any other
subordinate Union of the International Typographical Union, when such
strike is authorized by, or such lockout is recognized by, the ITU.
Section 13-A Joint Standing Committee of two representatives each of the
Employer and the Union shall be selected .... To this committee shall be
referred all disputes which may arise as to the application of and
construction to be placed upon any provision of this agreement, or alledged
violation thereof, which cannot be settled otherwise. Such joint committee
shall meet within seven days after any question shall have been referred to
it. . .. Should the Joint Standing Committee be unable to agree within ten
days, then the membership of the same shall within five days select a fifth
member ....
There shall be no strikes or lockouts during the term of this agreement
unless either party refuses to comply with the grievance procedure as
outlined hereinabove.
Id. at 1293.
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On appeal to the NLRB, a majority of the Board rejected the AW's
finding that Section 12 and extrinsic evidence gave rise to an
inference that Local 35 had waived its sympathy strike rights.3 Since
the dispute was precipitated by the strike of another union, it did not
fall under the no-strike clause of Section 13. In the Board's opinion,
there was no duty to arbitrate and the employees had not lost their
protected status in honoring picket lines.4
The Company did not pay the lost wages of the employees as
ordered by the NLRB; the case was thus referred to the Seventh
Circuit for enforcement. The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to
enforce the decision of the NLRB. The court held that because there
was doubt as to the interpretation of the contract provisions, the
case should have been decided by arbitration. Because the em-
ployees engaged in a sympathy strike before arbitrating its legality,
the court held they had lost their protected status and the discipline
against them was valid.
These various holdings in Keller-Crescent illustrate the respec-
tive positions of arbitration in the federal courts and the NLRB, as
well as a difference as to when a duty to arbitrate will be found.
ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS
Arbitration has been given a prominent position in federal labor
policy as a method of peaceful resolution of contract disputes. 5 To
promote the use of the private grievance machinery, federal courts
have adopted a presumption in favor of the arbitration of contract,
disputes.6 This presumption of arbitrability imposes on the parties
a duty to arbitrate any confusion over contract meaning before they
engage in activity which might be a breach of the agreement. In
Keller-Crescent, the Seventh Circuit held that the presumption
created a duty to arbitrate the sympathy strike dispute. The failure
3. Keller-Crescent Co., 217 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 89 L.R.R.M. 1201 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Keller-Crescent (NLRB)].
4. Id. at 1208.
5. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), Justice
Douglas wrote:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for
an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more
than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agree-
ments on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace
can be obtained in that way.
Id. at 454.
6. Id at 458.
1976]
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of the Keller-Crescent Company and Local 35 to arbitrate meant
that the sympathy strike was not protected activity and therefore
the Company had the right to discipline the employees. Hence, the
presumption of arbitrability outweighed protection of employee
rights.
Presumption of Arbitrability
While the Seventh Circuit in Keller-Crescent considered the
enforcement of an unfair labor practice charge, much of the
precedent on which the court relied to find arbitrability arose in the
context of contract violations. Federal courts are vested with the
authority to resolve alleged contract violations under Section 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act.7 Section 301 gives the
courts power to compel specific performance of the arbitration
agreements under collective bargaining contracts. The stated
purpose for such power is to hold the parties to the agreements they
privately enter.8
A presumption of arbitrability was first outlined in the well-
known Steelworkers Trilogy, 9 a series of three cases in which the
Supreme Court of the United States emphasized the importance of
arbitrating contract disputes. To be consistent with the Congres-
sional mandate in favor of arbitration, the Court argued that breach
of contract cases would be confined to the question of whether the
parties had agreed to arbitrate the grievance. 10 An order to
arbitrate should be given unless it could be said with "positive
assurance" that the arbitration clause did not cover the dispute:
"Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.""
In the Trilogy, the Court emphasized that parties should be held
7. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1964):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting interstate commerce, as
defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
8. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
9. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960).
10. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
11. Id. at 583.
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to their agreements because they had voluntarily bargained for
arbitration procedures and were free to draft these provisions as
broadly or as narrowly as they pleased. 12 In addition, many disputes
are complex and best resolved by an arbitrator familiar with the
situation rather than the courts.'3 Thus, the presumption expanded
the role of the arbitrator in ruling on the merits of a case and
limited the courts to determining the arbitrability of a given
dispute. 14
The extent to which the Supreme Court is willing to go to find
arbitrability is shown in Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers.15 In
Gateway, the miners held a strike, protesting the company's reten-
tion of a foreman who had falsified air flow records in the mine. The
Court held that the striking union could have arbitrated its
grievance. Emphasizing the presumption of arbitrability, the Court
noted that before the dispute would be held non-arbitrable, it must
be said "with positive assurance" that the arbitration clause did not
cover the dispute. 6 Although the parties in Gateway had not agreed
to arbitrate this specific dispute, the Court held that the arbitration
clause must be broadly construed to include the conflict over the
unsafe conditions.17
In Keller-Crescent, the Seventh Circuit employed the presump-
tion of arbitrability to find a duty to arbitrate. 8 Even though
it was faced with an unfair labor practice charge, the court relied on
federal cases based on contract violations to reach its conclusion.
The court carefully considered cases dealing with whether injunc-
tions could be used to end sympathy strikes where the parties had a
12. Id. at 580.
13. Id. at 582.
14. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 572
(1960).
15. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
16. Id. at 378.
17. Id. at 383.
18. Where there is doubt as to the contract interpretation, arbitration should be
invoked:
In light of Gateway, the Board's conclusion that the conduct of Local 35
members did not fall within the no-strike ban of Section 13 implies that the
Board can state with positive assurance that Section 13 was not susceptible
to an interpretation covering the asserted dispute over the application of a
construction to be placed upon Section 12. We do not think that the policy of
the labor statutes to implement private resolution of disputes in the manner
agreed upon ... allows this court to reach so easily a conclusion that the
dispute over the meaning of Section 13 was not an arbitrable issue.
Keller-Crescent at 1298.
1976]
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no-strike clause and arbitration agreement. The purpose of exam-
ining the injunction question was to determine whether these cases
changed the duty to arbitrate.
Injunctions and Arbitrability
Injunctions to enforce arbitration of no-strike agreements were
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770.19 The dispute in Boys Markets had arisen when
union members engaged in a work stoppage despite a no-strike
clause and an agreement that all disputes arising under the contract
would be subject to arbitration. A federal district court issued an
injunction to stop the strike and compel arbitration. The Supreme
Court affirmed, arguing that the effectiveness of arbitration would
be greatly diminished if injunctive relief were withheld for viola-
tions of a no-strike agreement.20
The central problem in Boys Markets was whether the injunc-
tion was barred by Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,21 which
prohibits the use of injunctions in labor disputes. The Court noted
that Section 4 had to be reconciled with Section 301 and the need to
enforce collective bargaining agreements.2 In this process, the
conditions which existed at the time Section 4 was enacted must be
considered; courts were regularly issuing injunctions against strikes
and inhibiting the right of unions to engage in concerted activity.
Because this was no longer the case, the Boys Markets Court
concluded that the limited use of injunctions was permissible. 3 In
this way the importance of arbitration was underscored by ex-
tending the use of injunctions to support it.
19. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
20. Id. at 248-49.
21. The Section provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order of temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute... from ... [c]easing or refusing
to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment .
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
22. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
23. The Court stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the unavailability of equitable relief in the
arbitration context presents a serious impediment to the congressional
policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful
resolution of labor disputes, that the core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is not sacrificed by the limited use of equitable remedies to further this
important policy. . ..
Id. at 253.
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The Supreme Court declined to extend the use of injunctions to
forbid sympathy strikes in Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers of
America.24 Buffalo Forge settled a conflict among the circuits25 over
whether a sympathy strike could be enjoined because it was an
arbitrable grievance. The Court found that the union did not
engage in the strike because of any problem with its own contract,
but only in support of a sister union. Because this was not a
violation of the agreement not to strike over the contract provisions,
no injunction should issue.26 If there was any doubt as to whether a
sympathy strike was included under the no-strike agreement, a
court could order arbitration, but could not issue an injunction to
end the strike. 21 Although the Court was unwilling to extend the
remedy of injunction to sympathy strikes under no-strike agree-
ments, the duty to arbitrate all conflicts over the meaning of a labor
contract was not abridged. 28
24. - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
25. The Fifth Circuit argued that a sympathy strike was not an arbitrable
grievance even where there was a no-strike clause in the contract. The court reasoned
that a sympathy strike by a union was in support of a sister union and not a grievance
which arose under the union's own contract. Hence, it could not be included in the
arbitration clause and no injunction would be issued. Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Buffalo Forge v. United
Steelworkers of America, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), affd, - U.S. -, 96 S.Ct.
3141 (1976); Plain Dealers Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union 53, 520
F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975); Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Union,
459 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1972).
The Fourth Circuit adopted contrary reasoning, arguing that a sympathy strike,
being a violation of a no-strike agreement, was arbitrable. Monongahela Power Co. v.
Local 2332, IBEW, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Valmac Indus. v. Food
Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1975); NAPA Pittsburg, Inc. v.
Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 877
(1974); Pilot Freight Carriers v. Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1049 (1974).
The Seventh Circuit adopted what the Supreme Court characterized as an
"intermediate position" in the conflict. Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers of
America, - U.S. -. , 96 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 n.19 (1976).
26. Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers of America, - U.S. __ , 96 S. Ct.
3141, 3148 .(1976).
27. The prime reason for refusing to issue an injunction was that the court
would be compelled to rule on the merits:
The court in such cases would be permitted, if the dispute was arbitrable, to
hold hearing, make findings of fact, interpret applicable provisions of the
contract and issue injunctions as to restore the status quo ante or to
otherwise regulate the relationship of the parties pending exhaustion of the
arbitral process. This would cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and make the courts potential participants in a wide range
of disputes.
Id. at 3148.
28. Id. at 3149.
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The Seventh Circuit in Keller-Crescent emphasized that Buffalo
Forge still upheld the importance of arbitration but only limited the
injunctive relief available to the employer.2 Accordingly, there
may be a duty to arbitrate a sympathy strike and the failure to do so
will render the strike illegal for purposes of an unfair labor practice
charge. The injunction controversy did not affect the determination
of arbitrability, but only altered the relief available.
Seventh Circuit Precedent
The presumption of arbitrability and the increased importance
of arbitration in federal court decisions were important factors in
the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Keller-Crescent. In the past,
the Seventh Circuit had placed great emphasis on the specific
wording of the contract. This test basing arbitrability on specific
wording had produced seemingly inconsistent decisions. 30 In one
instance, the court held that a restraining order to halt a sympathy
strike was appropriate where the parties had agreed to arbitrate
"any trouble of any kind arising in the mines" and had pledged not
to strike over arbitrable grievances. 81 However, in another instance
the court ruled that a sympathy strike was not arbitrable under an
agreement to arbitrate "any and all disputes and controversies
arising under or in connection with the terms of the provisions."3 2
The common theme which the Keller-Crescent court saw in both
cases was the emphasis on the contract wording to find arbi-
trability.33
29. The Seventh Circuit argued that Buffalo Forge strengthened the propo-
sition that courts should not involve themselves in disputes which could be decided by
the arbitrator. Therefore, as the issuance of an injunction against a sympathy strike
would for all practical purposes decide the merits of the case, the Buffalo Forge
decision represented an attempt to preserve the arbitrability of the dispute. Keller-
Crescent at 1296.
30. The Seventh Circuit's positions were not viewed charitably by one commen-
tator who classified them as "schizophrenic." Note, The Applicability of Boys Markets
Injunctions to Refusals to Cross Picket Lines, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 113, 126 (1976).
31. Inland Steel Co. v. UMW Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974). The
dispute in Inland Steel involved a refusal of coal miners to cross picket lines of
construction workers. The broad arbitration agreement and the no-strike clause
were the bases of the court's decision.
32. Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 511 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975), enforcing Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87,
86 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1974).
33. Keller-Crescent at 1299.
Another decision of the Seventh Circuit on sympathy strikes was Hyster Co. v.
Independent Towing Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975). The court compared the
contract language in Inland Steel with that in Gary-Hobart, and decided that the
provisions of the arbitration and no-strike clauses were closer to the latter.
Therefore, injunctive relief was denied.
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It was the blending of the presumption of arbitrability with the
specific contract wording which was the basis of the Seventh
Circuit's decision. The contract contained a no-strike and arbitra-
tion provision in Section 13, and a specification of which picket lines
Local 35 could honor in Section 12.34 At issue was whether Section
12 was an implied waiver of sympathy strike rights for all unions
other than the International Typographical Union. The court
declined to rule on this issue, choosing instead to fall back on the
presumption of arbitrability. If there was any doubt as to how the
contract was construed, and if it could not be said with positive
assurance that arbitration would not cover the dispute, then there
was a duty to arbitrate the waiver dispute. 35 The presumption of
arbitrability, added to the specific contract wording, tipped the
balance in favor of a duty to arbitrate.
The precedents cited by the Keller-Crescent court employed the
presumption of arbitrability to assist enforcement of the collective
bargaining agreement and emphasized the important part which
arbitration played in federal labor policy.3 6 Despite the recent
Supreme Court ruling on injunctions of sympathy strikes, the
presumption of arbitrability is not diminished. Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit held that all doubts as to the interpretation of the
Keller-Crescent contract were to be resolved in favor of arbitration.
The denial of enforcement of the NLRB's decision in Keller-Crescent
made it apparent that the Board had utilized a different standard
for finding arbitrability.
ARBITRATION AND THE NLRB
The Seventh Circuit's refusal to enforce the NLRB's decision in
Keller-Crescent highlights a different standard of arbitrability
employed in these two jurisdictions. The NLRB, vested with the
responsibility of hearing unfair labor practice cases and of pro-
tecting employee rights,37 has been more reluctant than the federal
courts to find a duty to arbitrate. In part, this NLRB reluctance has
34. See note 2 supra.
35. The court wrote:
We conclude that any requirement that the court first determine that the
union has unmistakably waived its sympathy strike rights before ascer-
taining the scope of a no-strike arbitration clause in an unfair labor practice
context would undercut the presumption in favor of arbitrability estab-
lished in the Steelworkers trilogy, confirmed in Gateway and favored in
Buffalo Forge.
Keller-Crescent at 1300.
36. Id.
37. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
1976]
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been because contract disputes are much more amenable to arbitra-
tion than are unfair labor practice cases, where the rights of
individual employees are at stake.3 The Board is willing to accept
arbitration rulings on unfair labor practice charges if they meet
certain standards. In recent years, this policy of deferral has been
extended to include disputes for which arbitration procedures have
been set up. In such a case, the NLRB will not make a decision but
will defer the issue to arbitration. Nonetheless, the ruling of the
NLRB in Keller-Crescent indicated that arbitrability was not to be
presumed as in federal courts, but must be proven before arbitra-
tion could be utilized.
Keller-Crescent represented a rare situation in which the sym-
pathy strike gave rise to two types of claims: one for breach of
contract and another as an unfair labor practice charge. As a
contract violation, the sympathy strike could be brought either
before an arbitrator or to the federal court. In addition, the
suspension of the employees could be heard by the NLRB as an
unfair labor practice charge. In upholding the dual jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that arbitration
should not be precluded simply because the conduct in question also
falls within the jurisdiction of the NLRB;39 neither should the Board
be prevented from hearing a case because it would be required to
interpret contract provisions. 40 In the event of a direct conflict the
power of the NLRB to protect the public interest remains primary
over the power of the arbitrator.41
Direct conflicts have in part been averted by the Board's greater
willingness to defer to the final decision of the arbitrator.42 This
movement to give arbitration a larger role in resolving unfair labor
practice charges has been similar to the expansion of arbitration in
federal courts to resolve contract disputes. However, these develop-
ments have not moved at a parallel pace, for the NLRB is more
reluctant to find arbitrability in a given case than the federal
courts. The Seventh Circuit's refusal to enforce the NLRB decision
38. R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW at 729 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GORMAN]. For
additional information as to remedies available to the employer during a sympathy
strike, see Connolly and Connolly, Employer's Rights Relative to Sympathy Strikes, 14
DuQ. L. REV. 121 (1976).
39. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (unfair labor
practice charge can be heard by arbitrator).
40. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 482 (1967) (Board may hear an arbi-
trable contract dispute).
41. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 266 (1964).
42. GORMAN, supra note 38, at 734.
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in Keller-Crescent resulted from application of the federal court's
standard for arbitrability which differed from the standard em-
ployed by the NLRB.
Deferral to Arbitration Award
A deferral to arbitration was at issue in Keller-Crescent. The
Company argued before the NLRB that the arbitration procedures
had been invoked and that the NLRB ought to defer to the
arbitration award. 43 This policy of deferral to arbitration awards
was first outlined by the NLRB in Speilberg Manufacturing Co.44
For such deferral to occur, the Board declared that three factors
had to be present: (1) the arbitration proceedings had to be fair and
regular; (2) all parties must have agreed to be bound to the
arbitrator's decision; and, (3) the decision of the arbitrator could not
conflict with the Board's statutory mandate of protecting worker's
rights.46 Under those circumstances, the NLRB will recognize and
give full weight to the award of the arbitrator.
In Keller-Crescent the Board refused to accept the Company's
argument for a Speilberg deferral. 47 The Company contended that
Local 35 had first requested the arbitration of the sympathy strike
question, and that the company had indicated its willingness to
43. Keller-Crescent (NLRB) at 1203.
44. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
45. Id. at 1082.
46. Id. at 1080. For a recent affirmation of Speilberg, see Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 147 (1969).
47. Assuming the correctness of the Board's finding with regard to the
Company's Speilberg argument, the Company might have also argued for a deferral to
future arbitration. Where the parties have set up arbitration procedures, the Board
will refuse to decide the case, but rather will defer to the use of the agreed
procedures. In Keller-Crescent the Company did not argue for this type of deferral,
although adequate precedent existed for the contention. The burden would have been
on the Company to demonstrate the arbitrability of the dispute.
Deferral of unfair labor practices disputes to arbitration was extended to
pending cases in Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931
(1971). In Collyer the Board stated that the trend in federal courts of stressing the
importance of arbitration and the desirability of requiring parties to honor their
contractual obligations made it necessary for the Board to withhold jurisdiction. The
unfair labor practice charge in Collyer had been brought under Section 8(a)5 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)5 (1964), which prohibits unfair
labor practices by the employer. In National Radio Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80
L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972), deferral was extended to cases arising under sancrosanct
Section 8(a)3, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)3 (1964), which forbids employer discrimination.
However, an 8(a)3 case will not be deferred where it is unreasonable to expect full
litigation in the arbitration process. See also Electronic Reproduction Corp., 213
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arbitrate. However, Local 35 did not propose another member for
the arbitration committee, the next step in the procedure. There-
fore, when the time limit specified in the contract for such a step
had expired, the arbitration machineryhad made its award. This
award, the Company argued, should be recognized by the NLRB.
The Board, however, found insufficient evidentiary support for this
argument.4
In refuting the Company's argument, the Board outlined the
place of arbitration in the framework of the NLRB. The company
had failed to provide sufficient proof of a Speilberg deferral; it had
failed, in other words, to meet its burden of proof. 49 The principle
reason for the NLRB decision was that in this instance, arbitrability
provided an affirmative defense to the suspension of the sympathy
strikers. Herein lay the chief difference between the NLRB and the
federal courts. Arbitrability was presumed in the federal courts but
the NLRB in Keller-Crescent contended that the company had the
burden of proving arbitrability. This difference was the crux of the
conflict between the two jurisdictions in Keller-CrescenL
IMPACT OF CONTRASTING VIEWS
The sympathy strike conflict in Keller-Crescent provides a
graphic example of the impact of the contrasting views of the NLRB
and the Seventh Circuit. The failure to agree on the standard for
arbitrability has two effects. First, it is unclear when those engaged
in a sympathy strike will be subject to discipline and when their
right to honor picket lines will be protected. Second, the un-
certainty as to when sympathy strike rights are deemed to be
waived affects the drafting of labor contracts.
N.L.R.B. No. 110, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974); Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2,
80 L.R.R.M. 1743 (1972); Appalachian Power Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 80 L.R.R.M.
1731 (1972). For a discussion of Section 8(a)3 deferral, see Simon-Rose, Deferral Under
Coilyer by NLRB of Section 8(a)s Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 201 (1976).
48. The majority of the Board held:
In our opinion this evidence fails to support Respondent's [Company's]
contention and argument. Thus as heretofore noted, the record does not
clearly disclose that the Union, as opposed to the Respondent, invoked the
grievance machinery.
Keller-Crescent (NLRB) at 1203.
49. The Board summed up its standard:
In relying on deferral pursuant to Speilberg as an affirmative defense,
Respondent (Company) had the burden of pleading it, which it did not do,
and proving facts sufficient to establish the applicability of the principles
established in the Speilberg case.
Id. at 1204.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss1/6
DUTY TO ARBITRATE
The ultimate question in Keller-Crescent was whether the
employer could discipline employees for their part in the sympathy
strike. Hence, the characterization of the sympathy strike as
either protected or unprotected concerted activity was important.
Resolution of the question directly depended on the determination of
the duty to arbitrate. Inconsistency between the courts and the
NLRB on that issue placed the employees in a precarious situation.
They risked possible discipline by the employer for participating in
the strike, and possible discipline by the union for crossing the
picket lines.5°
Drafting of waiver clauses governing sympathy strikes is also
affected by the differing views of arbitrability. The immediate
source of controversy between the Company and Local 35 in Keller-
Crescent was whether Section 12 of the collective bargaining
agreement prohibited sympathy strikes.51 The Board held that
because a waiver of sympathy strike rights must be "clear and
unmistakable," Section 12 was not a waiver of the rights.5 2 On the
other hand, the Seventh Circuit held that there was sufficient doubt
as to whether these rights had been impliedly waived by the
specification of which lines could be honored; therefore the issue
should have been brought to an arbitrator.
The Board's demand in Keller-Crescent for an express waiver
indicated a general hostility to any limitations of employee rights to
engage in sympathy strikes.3 In Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v.
50. GORMAN, supra note 38, at 324.
51. See note 2 supra.
52. Keller-Crescent (NLRB) at 1207. In his dissent, Board member Penello
wrote:
In my opinion, this language expressly granted the employees the right to
refuse to cross picket lines of a subordinate union of the ITU, inescapably
implied that the ITU Local 35 members were prohibited from honoring any
other picket lines ...
In conclusion, in these circumstances it is clear that under Section 12 of
the contract, ITU Local 35 waived the employees statutory rights to lend
support to striking Pressmen by refusing to report to work. Since such
activity by employees in violation of their collective bargaining agreement
is not statutorily protected, Respondent lawfully took reprisal action against
the charging parties.
Id. at 1210.
53. The NLRB has not always been consistent in the question of waiver, as
illustrated in Alliance Mfg. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 82 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1974). In
Alliance, on the basis of contract provisions and extrinsic evidence, the Board held
that a no-strike clause covered all work stoppages, even those which had to do with
issues not subject to the arbitration procedures. Courts have not been consistent in
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NLRB,54 the Seventh Circuit enforced an NLRB decision that the
Company had committed an unfair labor practice by suspending
sympathy strikes. There the collective bargaining agreement
contained a no-strike provision but made no mention of sympathy
strike rights. The NLRB held that a waiver must be "clear and
unmistakable" before it would be effective.5 5 This test was affirmed
by the Seventh Circuit in granting enforcement to the Board's
decision.
In Keller-Crescent, the Seventh Circuit conditioned its view of
the waiver issue on the presumption of arbitrability. The court
argued it would make no sense to find arbitrability only where there
was an unmistakable waiver of sympathy strike rights. To demand
express language for a waiver would negate the presumption of
arbitrability by taking away the disputed issue. In light of the
presumption of arbitrability, it would be undesirable to preempt
arbitration.56 The Seventh Circuit maintained that the Gary-Hobart
decision could be distinguished: in that case there was no sympathy
strike clause to engender any doubt or controversy. 57 The result of
the Keller-Crescent reasoning was that a "clear and unmistakable"
waiver was not unconditionally necessary to warrant arbitration.
Where there was sufficient doubt as to whether a given contract
clause and series of negotiations constituted a waiver of the
sympathy strike rights, the presumption of arbitrability mandated
private resolution of the dispute.
At present there is a discrepancy between the Seventh Circuit
and the NLRB as to the requirements of a sympathy strike waiver.
As a result, there is confusion about the effect of a no-strike
agreement because of the doubts as to which work stoppages will be
their requirements for waiver. Compare Montana-Dakota Utility Co. v. NLRB, 455
F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972), with Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 510 (6th Cir. 1972), and
Gen'l Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1971). In Union News v.
NTLRB, 393 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1968), it was held that in the absence of a specific clause
preserving the right to engage in sympathy strikes, a broad no-strike clause precludes
a sympathy strike.
54. 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975), enforcing Gary-
Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1974).
55. Gary-Hobart (NLRB) at 1214.
56. The court held:
On this record, it makes no sense to conclude that the court can find that a
dispute is arbitrable only after finding in the present agreement an
unmistakable waiver of the union's sympathy strike rights. In the light of
the federal policy'favoring arbitration, such a conclusion would preempt the
role of the arbitral panel.
Keller-Crescent at 1300 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 1299.
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considered waived and which will not. To insure complete coverage
by a no-strike agreement, negotiators would be required to enumer-
ate in advance all potential disputes. This is clearly an impossible
task and the need to do so represents a restriction on the coverage of a
no-strike agreement. Where such a difference in standards of the
Seventh Circuit and the NLRB exists, the draftsman must decide for
which forum he is drafting a no-strike clause.
CONCLUSION
Keller-Crescent illustrates the different standards for arbitra-
bility applied by the Seventh Circuit and the NLRB. Vested with
the duty to enforce collective bargaining agreements, federal courts
employ a presumption of arbitrability to facilitate private resolution
of disputes. Arbitrabilit must be proved before the Board will find
a duty to arbitrate, because arbitrability operates as an affirmative
defense to an unfair labor practice charge. In Keller-Crescent the
Seventh Circuit was willing to presume arbitrability, while the
NLRB demanded that it be specifically proven. The different tests
employed resulted in the NLRB finding that the Company had
committed an unfair labor practice while the Seventh Circuit
refused to enforce the Board decision.
Arbitration offers the best opportunity for parties to establish
their respective rights before there is unnecessary harm to either
side. To accomplish this, a duty to arbitrate should be construed
broadly and arbitration should occur at the earliest possible time.
The result will be greater stability in the respective positions of the
parties and less confusion as to the rights of the individuals
involved. The inconsistent positions of the Seventh Circuit and the
NLRB as to the duty to arbitrate has the effect of injecting
disorder into a situation which demands greater order.
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